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DEBTS IN COLLAPSED FOREIGN CURRENCIES
EVSEY S. RASHBA t
RATES of foreign exchange are ordinarily subject to fluctuation. It is
always necessary, therefore, when a debt expressed in terms of a foreign
currency must be translated into domestic currency, to know as of what
date the computation is to be made. The rules of law governing the deter-
mination of that date are not settled. Difference of opinion persists, in
particular, as to when the "breach-day rule," and when the "judgment-day
rule," is to be applied.
When, however, the date of computation has been determined, another
difficulty may arise, namely, that the value of the foreign money on that
date does not reflect normal fluctuations of the rate of exchange, but, as
may occur in consequence of monetary hyperinflation, has been in effect
destroyed. Events now in progress are likely to make this difficulty a
matter of considerable practical importance.
I
In any major war the greater part of a nation's industrial production
ceases to furnish goods for the market and supplies materials to be con-
sumed on the battlefield. To the increased quantity of paper money which
the government has to put in circulation, there corresponds not an in-
creased but a diminished quantity of goods that may be purchased with
this money. The more the money is used for purchasing goods, rather
than for paying taxes, buying war bonds or making other savings, the
more it depreciates and the more the price of goods tends to rise.
Whereas in the United States the inflationary process will presumably
be kept in strict bounds, it will be otherwise in Europe. We need not specu-
late about the conditions that will prevail in Germany after it is defeated.
They should eventually be worse than the conditions in those countries
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which are now or have been under the German yoke. It will suffice to
glance at these.
France has paid Germany some 500 billions of francs as the alleged
cost of the German occupation, a sum far exceeding the actual cost. A
large part of this has been used by the Germans to acquire property, whether
shares of stock or treasures of art, and to remove to Germany what could
be carried away. Thus the French have been giving up their real values
and receiving in return some of their own money. The continuous increase
in circulation has gone hand in hand with growing impoverishment. As
long as necessities of life are rationed, the measure of this impoverishment
is to be observed primarily in the black market where a fowl in some places
now costs more than a worker earns in a month. Clearly there is real
danger that, sooner or later, the latent catastrophe must break throttgh.
The situation in other countries occupied and looted by Germany is not
substantially different. When the Allied torces entered Greece one dollar
could buy 100 million drachmas,1 and only recently it was reported that a
pound of black bread was worth 45 billion drachmas.2
Planning concerning the restoration of the world's currencies looks to the
future. It cannot undo the destruction of values that has been vrought
in the past. It is possible, even probable, that the peace settlement will, fix,
as was done at Versailles, rates of exchange to be applied in specific cases;
it may also be that jurisdiction over entire groups of controversies will be
entrusted to international arbitration tribunals and that the consideration
of many problems will thus be transferred from the ordinary courts to
these or other specially created bodies. Other cases will, of course, remain
outside the scope of the future treaties; Americans, for example, who lived
and did business with one another in France, and, contracted debts there
in francs, and who have since come home, will desire, when the debts have
fallen due, to see them settled here.
By whatever tribunal and process the cases may eventually be adjudi-
cated, it is timely to examine the law concerning obligations expressed in
terms of a currency which has collapsed. The amount of a claim will be
important even when the debtor may be unable to discharge his obligations
in full.
The problem is analogous to that which arose after the first World War.
Lord Keynes once remarked that the memory of men is in general so
short that they know the past hardly better than the future. Nor is it to
be wondered that, especially here amid relatively stable economic conditions,
there are few who have a vivid idea of the tremendous monetary catastro-
phes which took place at that time in Europe.
Germany ffirnishes the most striking example. In the twenties the
issue of German paper money was abused to such an extent that the prices
1. See TnFi, Nov. 6, 1944, p. 79, col. 2.
2. See LnFE, Nov. 27, 1944, p. 26.
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of goods not only doubled or trebled but soared so high that eventually
the savings of a lifetime would not suffice to buy a box of matches and an
American dollar was accepted as the equivalent of the fantastic sum of
4,200,000,000,000 paper marks. When Schacht's monetary reform of
1924 created the new reichsmark, which precisely like the mark of the
German Empire had a statutory value of 358.42 mgr. fine gold, one reichs-
mark was declared equivalent to previously issued paper money of the
face amount of one trillion marks.'
The fate of the Russian currency was not dissimilar. To the so-called
Romanoff and Kerensky rubles was added an astronomical amount of
different kinds of "monetary tokens" issued by the Soviets. 'Most of these
various ruble notes were later simply annulled. The gold ruble recreated by
the statutes of 1924 as the basis of the present Russian system, and theo-
retically amounting to the 774:234 mgr. fine gold which was the value of
the Romanoff ruble, is not legally connected with the pre-revolutionary
ruble. The measure of the antecedent inflation, however, is apparent from
the fact that a single new ruble was at one time deemed worth 50,000,000,000
old ones.'
American and English courts, in dealing with debts expressed in marks,
rubles or other utterly depreciated currencies, have been disposed to regard
such debts as having vanished with the money in which they were expressed.
Anderson v. Equitable Life Assurancc Society r is a pertinent English
case. An Englishman, who in 1887 was residing and carrying on business
in Russia, procured there, through an agent of a German branch of an
American insurance company, a semi-tontine life policy. By this policy,
in consideration of the payment in London of an initial premium of
2,149.80 marks and of quarterly premiums of 570 marks for twenty years,
the company undertook to pay, in London, 60,000 marks on the death of
the insured. The policy became fully paid in 1907 when, as the trial
judge pointed out, the company had received about £2377 in premiums.
Periodical bonuses or profits to which the insured then became entitled,
and which were paid until his death in 1922, were uniformly computed on
the basis of the par value of the mark in complete disregard even of the
extraordinary depreciation of German money during the latter years of
his life. In an action to recover the amount of the policy, the insured's
widow contended that this amount likewise should be computed on the
par value of the mark. But Lord Justice Bankes, speaking for the Court
of Appeal, felt "bound to give a decision which would work great hardship
on the plaintiff" '; the policy having been contracted in marks, and the
3. See ELSTER, VOX DE MkRK ZVR rxcxs rYR (192S) 433.
4. See StDILLOT, LE DR.umE DRs 'MONN IEs (2d. ed. 1937) 141 c scq.; HumArl,
SoWET MoNEY AND FINANCE (1936).
5. 42 T. L. R. 123 (K. B. 1925), re-zd, 42 T. L. R. 302 (C. A 1926).
6. 42 T. L. R. at 302.
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value of 60,000 paper marks being now infinitesimal, the insurance com-
pany was not required to pay a penny.
In the United States, the federal courts have considered the question in
several actions in which one Tillman has been the plaintiff. In Tilinan v.
Russo Asiatic Bank I the defendant, in September, 1918, in Russia, had
dishonored a check for 72,000 rubles drawn by the plaintiff. The latter
paid the amount to the payee and, years later, sought in this action to
recover some $37,000 on the theory that the value of one ruble was 51.4
cents in United States currency. This was the par value of the ruble estab-
lished by the coinage law of czarist Russia and by the Soviet law which
was in force when the action was brought. There being no proof that the
bank was bound to pay its obligations in gold, the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Augustus N. Hand, took
the position that the draft was originally payable "in old rubles" and,
pointing out that the plaintiff had not shown that the Soviet decrees "estab-
lished any ratio of exchange for the old currency," further observed that
on the date of the judgment, which was held to be the decisive date, the
old rubles, on the contrary, were "said to have disappeared and to have
become worthless." 8 Judgment was thus given for the defendant.
Among state court cases reference should be made to Dougherty v.
Equitable Life Assurance Society,10 a leading New York case dealing
with a number of actions which arose out of Russian insurance contracts.
In many of these actions, policy holders sought to recover back, on the
ground of a rescission of their contracts, the premiums which they had
paid over a period of years in rubles. In the view of the Court of Appeals
it was the ruble recovery in Russia-what the assured would have re-
ceived there-which was being sued for here. The court held that the
obligations were payable, if at all, in worthless rubles and had, therefore,
themselves become worthless.
7. 51 F. (2d) 1023 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931), cert. denied, 285 U. S. 539 (1932).
8. 51 F. (2d) at 1026.
9. This position was reaffirmed recently in Tillman v. National City Bank, 118 F. (2d)
631 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 650 (1941). The plaintiff, this time as
assignee of an Englishman, attempted to recover the balance of an account in rubles
which in 1917 had been established in the branch office of the defendant bank in Russia
and which had since remained unclaimed. Here, too, the court, speaking again through
Judge Hand, held in practical effect that the defendant was discharged of any obligation
whatsoever.
The American Consular Court in Shanghai, in 1926, in holding, after the collapse of
the German currency, that a life insurance policy could still be paid in German marks,
said: "The defendant has performed ... its contract under this insurance policy when it
tendered to the plaintiff German paper marks in the full amount specified in the cash
surrender value for the fourth year of the policy." Oliver v. Asia Life Insurance Co. (1937)
66 JuRIsTIscHE WocHmscmm'T 712.
10. 266 N. Y. 71, 193 N. E. 897 (1934).
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The decided cases cannot be said to establish a general principle of law.
Many of the opinions clearly show how troubled the judges were in choos-
ing their way, the result seeming often to offend their sense of justice.
This may be why they were disposed to place behind a shield of findings
of fact the statements in which we are here interested or to include them
in a series of arguments supporting the court's conclusion. The decisions
contain most interesting dicta, but it is difficult to find in this field more
than what Professor Karl N. Llewellyn would call a "third-water au-
thority."
Some commentators, especially in foreign countries, have attributed
significance to the fact that .the Anglo-American courts have had mostly
to deal with claims "imported" from abroad and asserted against nationals
of the forum. Even if these courts were ever disposed to regard with
favor the dangerous notion recently advanced in some quarters that justice
in private litigations should be administered with a view to the advantage
of nationals of the forum, this notion would scarcely afford any reason
for continued adherence to the course which the courts have followed.
Among the cases there are several in which the frustrated creditors v;ere
nationals of the forum; H and, at least in the case of the United States,
it is obvious that, with its continuing shift from the position of a debtor
to that of a creditor nation, the situation heretofore prevailing will be re-
versed. But the paramount fact is, of course, that it is not to be lightly
assumed that American or English courts have been or may be influenced
by a false doctrine leading them to-depart from the sacred principle of
equal protection of the law.
There are entirely different considerations in the light of which the de-
cisions should be read. When the cases were litigated, the courts had at
hand general rules for the computation of foreign debts in domestic cur-
rency which had been long accepted in ordinary cases and which, in
practice, required but a glance at the exchange rates quoted in the daily
market reports. The great monetary catastrophes originating in the first
World War were regarded as strange and unique and were not deemed
to warrant a departure from the long-established rules. This attitude of the
courts may have been strengthened by the somewhat perplexing fact that
they were scarcely ever urged by counsel in these cases to re-examine the
basic elements of the problem in the light of vivid realities.
II
Normally in any country it is the national money which fulfills all the
functions of money, serving, in particular, as the medium of exchange and
as the standard of value. Thus Americans in their own country make pay-
11. See, e.g., the Anderson case, discussed supra, pp. 3-4.
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ments in dollars and state assets and liabilities in terms of dollars. In
transactions involving more than one country, reference to the money of
one of the countries can have a similar meaning. The intention may be
that the obligation is to be performed and that its extent is to be measured
in the particulat kind of money although that money may change in value
as compared with other national moneys.
Richard v. American UnionBank 12 furnishes an example. An Amer-
ican bank undertook to establish a credit of two million lei in Bucharest
for the plaintiffs. It failed to do so on the date specified and created the
credit only'after the leu had greatly depreciated in terms of dollars. The
plaintiffs were held to have no right to recover in an action for breach of
contract. The court pointed out that during the entire period in question the
leu continued to be the same monetary unit, that the plaintiffs obtained on the
deferred date the same number of lei to which they were entitled on the
due date, and that "it is impossible to say that lei measured by lei had de-
clined in market value." 13
More frequentlY, however, a function is assigned to foreign money
other than that which it has in the country of its origin. Americans may
treat foreign money as a peculiar kind of merchandise; they so treat it
when they buy it from a banker. The foreign money then is not intended
to be a standard of value but, on the contrary, is itself measured in dollars
at the current rate of exchange. On this theory the plaintiffs in the Richard
case, after having lost their suit, brought a new action,14 in which they
stressed that they were dealers in foreign exchange and that the lei were
bought for resale. The complaint was held to state a good cause of action:
"The value of performance at the stipulated time of delivery was fixed by
the price of lei at that time in the market here .... The allegations of the
complaint in the preseht action show that the parties dealt in foreign moneys
or credits as a commodity.... The fact that the commodity... might in a
foreign country be used as a medium of exchange becomes irrelevant." 10
If, in a particular transaction, money is not to serve as a standard of
value, but is itself to be the object of valuation, it does not necessarily
follow that it is to be valued in terms of the money of another country.
It may, for example, be valued in gold. Benners v. Clemens,'0 decided in
1868 by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, involved an invoice of fruit
amounting to $896.95. The debt was contracted in England and it was
testified that the account was made up on the basis of gold and that the
charges were supposed to be paid in gold. Stipulations for payment in
12. 241 N. Y. 163, 149 N. E. 338 (1925).
13. Id. at 167, 149 N. E. at 339.
14. Richard v. American Union Bank, 253 N. Y. 166, 170 N. E. 532 (1930).
15. Id. at 175, 170 N. E. at 535.
16. 58 Pa. 24 (1868).
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gold were current at that time and were not prohibited by law." The court
accordingly held that the defendant had to pay in gold coin or to give so
much more in paper currency as would make his payment in that medium
equivalent to the balance due in gold. Paper money could serve as the
means of payment; the obligation was to be measured in gold.
There can be still other situations. Thus the parties, althcough expressing
an obligation in terms of a particular money, may lay principal emphasis on
the purpose to be accomplished by the payment. In In re JVilling's Estzae 13
an American court had to convert from francs to dollars the annuities be-
queathed in a French will. The intention of the testatrix, said the court,
"was evidently to devote some stable and fixed sum for the life use of
those whom she named as beneficiaries." "9 It concluded that the instal-
ments should be computed in dollars according to the value oif the franc
when the will was made and not in accordance with its value at a later time
when, in terms of dollars, the franc had greatly depreciated. An analogous
problem came before the Cohir d'Appel of Paris in the case of Soc2h1 des
Cirages Francais."° The former manager of an industrial establishment
in Russia owned by a French concern was entitled, by the terms of his
contract, to an annual pension of 2,400 rubles. He left Russia after the
Revolution. In a suit brought in France, he was met with the objection that
the ruble in the meantime had become worthless. The French court, liow-
ever, took the position that emphasis sht ould le placed not on the fact
that payment was stipulated in rubles, this having been for the obvious
purpose of serving the convenience of the retired employee then living in
Russia, but on the fact that the intention was to secure him adequate means
of subsistence for the rest of his life. A sound interpretation of the con-
tract, in the view of the French judges, would not permit the employer's
obligation to be destroyed by the depreciation or disappearance of the
kind of money contemplated for the payment of the pension earned by the
employee. It was held that payment of the annuities should be computed in
francs at the rate of exchange existing at the time the contract was made.
In these cases the foreign money was regarded as merely "money of ac-
count." In contrast, let us return to the Andcrson case,"' in which the Court
of Appeal of England, because of the fantastic depreciation of the German
mark, denied a widow the benefit of her husband's insurance. It would
appear that the amount of the policy, which was payable in London, was
17. See Bronson v. Rodes, 7 Wall. 229 (U. S. l tS).
18. 292 Pa. 51, 140 At. 558 (1928); cf. Bowditch v. Soltyk, 9 Mass. 1,b (L 3);
Matter of Lendle, 250 N. Y. 502, 166 N. E. 182 (1929) ; In re Illfelder's Estate, 136 Misc.
430, 240 N. Y. Supp. 413 (Surr. CL 1930).
19. 292 Pa. 51, 57, 140 AUt. 558, 560 (1928).
20. Cour d'Appel, Paris, Nov. 28, 1927, (1928) 55 JUoLRUAL Du DolTr IN:; NhaxwAL
(Clunet) 119.
21. Discussed supra, pp. 3-4.
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stipulated in marks for the sole reason that it was an agent of the German
branch of the American company who solicited the Englishman in Russia.
It may safely be assumed that to the minds of the parties the choice of the
particular money had no materiality whatsoever. At any rate, there is
not the slightest indication that, in making the insurance contract, the
parties ever intended to cast the risk of a destruction of the German cur-
rency on the party having the least possibility to hedge or otherwise to
secure himself against such a risk. It is important, moreover, that for the
purpose of computing contingent liabilities, the company itself continued to
treat the mark as being of the sanie value of exchange as before 1914
even after a tremendous depreciation had taken place. If the judges had
taken into consideration the variety of ways in which stipulations in foreign
money may be regarded, they would perhaps not have needed merely to
express "the hope" that the company "could see their way to do some-
thing to mitigate the hardship to the plaintiff." 22 On the facts of the case,
it is submitted, the judges, treating the mark as money of account, could
have awarded a judgment that conformed with their own sense of justice.
Judges have sometimes been tempted to indulge in general statements on
how the courts are to treat foreign money, discussing, for instance, whether
it should be considered as money at all or should be regarded in the same
way as wheat that has been contracted for. It is easy to see that generaliza-
tions are here of no avail. There are dissimilar situations necessitating
different solutions and often requiring learning, imagination and ability
on the part of counsel if the case is to be presented in its proper setting.
The background of the various special situations and difficulties, only
some of which have been here touched on, should, however, be kept in mind
in the discussion which follows and which will be confined to the basic
situation only, namely, that the foreign money in which the contract was
expressed was intended as the measure of the obligation, that the money
has lost its value to such an extent as "to shock the conscience and produce
an exclamation," 3 and that because of this collapse the standard of measure
appears no longer to serve its intended purpose.
III
The general nature of the questions arising in this basic situation makes
it useful to turn first to the rules of law developed in countries which in
our time have witnessed the collapse of their own currency.
22. 42 T. L. R. 302 (C. A. 1926).
23. Savage, C. J., in Seymour v. Delancy, 3 Cow. 445, 521 (N. Y. 1824). Judges have
spoken of a "fantastically depreciated" money [Mackinnon, J., in Franklin v. Westminster
Bank (K. B. 1931), reported in MAIN, TH LEGAL AsPEcr oF MfoNEY (1938)
315], of "collapsed" exchanges [Sankey, J., in Ivar & Christensen v. Furness, Withy & Co.,
12 Lloyd's L. L. Rep. 288 (K. B. 1922), cited by Scxioo, Rf-G:IAIN JURIDIco DE LAS OBI--
GACIONES MoNETARIAs INTERNATIONALES (1940) 514, n. 1400] of a "catastrophic deprecia-
tion" [German Reichsgericht, Nov. 28, 1923, 107 Entscheidungen des Reiclsgerichts in
Zivilsachen (hereinafter cited as R. G. Z.) 78, 901.
[Vol. 54 : 1
1944] DEBTS IN COLLAPSED FOREIGN CURRENCIES 9
In the German Civil Code, as:in the books of other countries, no provision
was made for the unforeseen emergency of a major inflation. When, soon
after the first World War, numerous long term contracts for the sale of
goods or for the performance of services became utterly ruinous b2cause
of the supervening extraordinary rise of prices, ways were siought to
afford relief to the obligors. In 1919, after prices had risen to too;re than
eight times their pre-war level, the German courts became disposed to hold
that performance under the new economic conditions might be considered
"essentially different" from the performance contracted for. The courts,
thus in effect redefined the concept of impossibility of performance to in-
clude economic as well as physical impossibility, permitting contracts, at
least in cases of special hardship, to be dissolved."
Soon other situations arose. There was, for example, a case in which
a lessor of business premises in Berlin had agreed in 1912 to furnish steam
heat until the expiration of the lease in 1920.25 In consequence of the tre-
mendous increase in the price of coal and labor, the lessor, in order too
perform his obligation, had to pay a sum vastly in excess of what he was
to receive. It seemed too drastic simply to permit the lessor to rescind the
lease because of the difficulty relating to only one of its incidents. In this,
as well as in antalagous cases, it appeared more appropriate to arrive at a
reasonable revision of the price term. The courts resorted to the general
requirement that "good faith" must prevail in the relation, litwcen con-
tracting parties " and to the various ramifications of the doctrine of
"changed conditions" which have been developed as an offsh,,tot of that
requirement. There was a revival of the ancient maxim chwasila rebss sic
stantibus. A theory of the "foundation of the transaction," or, as we
should perhaps say here, of the "frustration of the vt.nture," was also
urged. 5  There was advanced, finally, a closely related idea with some-
what wider implications that in private contracts a certain "equivalence"
can normally be required between the performances tn either side and
that judicial intervention becomes necessary when this equivalence is de-
stroyed by supervening monetary inflation.2' In cases such as that of the
lessor who had agreed to furnish steam heat, the courts fixed a "reasunable"
-increase of the-sum to be paid and by a kind of conditional decree ruled that
24. German Reichsgericht, Dec. 2, 1919, 9 R. G. Z. 13.
25. German Reichsgericht, Sept. 21, 1920, IOUl R. G. Z. 12'.
26. "The debtor is bound to effect the performance according t,4 thtv ktquirauull, .,t
good faith, ordinary usage being taken into consideration." G Crs',x. IL )I. Cot : V aufg',
trans., 1907) art. 242. See also arts. 133 and 157.
27. See Krueckmann, Clausula rebus sic stanfibus, Kriegslaiuscl, Strei:hLlat~s1 t lus 
116 AaRcimv ru.R CwnsTiscHE Praxis 157.
29. See Oertmann, Dcr Einfluss v'on Herstchuiigsvrterunjcu a~i) die LieJcrp j~'lwt
(1920)-- 49 JunisTiscHnV WOCHENSCRIFT 476; OFRIA:::, DIE :
(1921).
29. See STADIJ(ER, Ko1-E1TAR z2m BEVu Ic)L- ).z L:;-
FUEHERTTNGSGESErz (9th ed. 1925-31) art. 242 (V) (1) (b).
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the lessor was released from his contract only if the amount as thus
modified was not paid.30
The new ideas were further developed from case to case by a process
familiar to lawyers in England and the United States but rather unusual
in civil law countries. Outright revision of money obligations through
rules of contract law became increasingly deep-rooted in the field of mon-
etary claims for goods sold and services rendered. It was extended also to
other cases, as, for example, those in which valuation was merely inci-
dental to the primary purpose of specific performance. Said the German
Supreme Court in 1922: "The gold mark, which was the basis for the
original appraisal, and the paper mark, in which satisfaction must now
be made, are ... economically not comparable." "1
The last and most important step was a generalization of the revisionary
process to embrace simple money obligations and, in particular, those for
repayment of money lent. This led to what may be considered revaluation
proper of claims expressed in marks. It took place only in the last stages
of the inflation. The situation had by then become intolerable. Extreme
depreciation of the mark brought, on the one hand, untold hardships;
claims of persons who had lent their money to their government or had
deposited it with savings banks, or who had acquired insurance policies
or mortgages, were practically wiped out, as were also the endowments
of educational and charitable institutions. On the other hand, speculators
who anticipated the course of events, and who found means to multiply
debts to be later paid off in worthless marks, accumulated enormous wealth.
Confusion in moral and legal notions was an inevitable consequence. In
the presence of the mounting burden of injustice, the courts were not
willing to admit that creditors should remain impoverished while debtors,
in the same measure, unduly benefited merely because of an extravagant
change in monetary conditions. They finally developed rules depriving
debtors of the possibility of discharging their debts by the simple payment
of an unaltered amount in a wholly depreciated money and requiring them,
on the contrary, to pay a larger sum in order to be discharged.
In achieving this result the courts, it is true, were met with objections
based on the German legal tender legislation. Here, too, resort was had-
first of all to the paramount principle of "good faith." In the leading
case on the subject, decided in 1923 and involving a mortgage executed
in 1913 on land in a former German colony, the German Supreme Court
said:
"The legislature, in enacting these [legal tender] provisions, did
not contemplate an essential depreqiation of paper money, especially
one so great as developed steadily after the ... World War and the
30. Compare German Reichsgericht, Feb. 3, 1933, 103 R. G. Z. 328.
31. German Reichsgericht, June 27, 1922, 104 R. G. Z. 394, 397.
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Revolution. With the collapse of the paper mark there ensued a
conflict between these currency provisions on the one side and, on
the other, all these various legal provisions which were designed to
prevent a debtor from being in a position to rid himself of his obliga-
tions in a manner which could not be reconciled with the require-
ments of good faith and with commercial usages, that is to say,
with the overriding mandate of Article 242 of the Civil Code.32 In
this conflict this mandate must take precedence and the currency
legislation must give way, because, as shown above, when the cur-
rency legislation was enacted it was not foreseen that such a collapse
of the currency might occur that the results could not be reconciled
with the basic rules of good faith and with fairness, it thus appear-
ing that a strict application of its provisions in this situation was
not contemplated." 33
While the German Supreme Court was thus clearly prepared to declare
the legal tender legislation inoperative, this was apparently not requisite
for the view which ultimately prevailed in Germany. The position taken
was that the courts, when they intervened to revalue claims, did not alter
the contract, but, on the contrary, sought to carry out as far as prac-
ticable what they presumed the parties would have agreed on if they
had foreseen the possibility of what actually i ccurred. A ct nditil-n
read into contracts thus permitted the courts, again on the basis of "general
rules of law," to revise the amount of money that was specified as though
the contract contained a stable-value clause." The legal tender in which
the debt, as thus revised, was to be discharged seemed then not to be in-
volved at all.
The revaluation of mark claims effected by the courts was a su-called
free revaluation. It was not bound by any uniform rule. Instead, like
the revision previously arrived at of the price term in bilateral contracts,
it was dependent on the special facts of each case, carefully weighed and
balanced by the trial judge."' How was the judge, however, to distinguish
between situations involving ordinary business risks and those calling for
the extraordinary expedient of revaluation? With regard to claims found
to be subject to revaluation, what amount should the obligor be required
to pay in the particular situations of the various cases? Should the orig-in
of the debt, the particular relation in which the parties stood to each other,
32. See note 26 supra.
33. German Reichsgericht, Nov. 28, 1923, 107 R. G. Z. 78, 3S.
34. This occurred as early as 1923. Oberlandesgericht, Cologne, Oct. 18, 1923 t1923) 52
JumsTiscHE WocHEzscaRIFT 1048; German Reichsgericht, Jan. 10, 1924, 107 R. G. Z. 400.
35. See STAuDiNGER, op. cit. supra note 29, at art. 242; STAun, Kusx;mn zmzx
-AN-DELsGmsE-zBucH (14th ed. 1932-33, annex to art. 374. For an interesting example
of a somewhat analogous free adjustment of claims in English law see The Monqy-Lenders
Act, 1900, c. 51, and cases cited in 35 E. & E. Dig. 166, 212-3.
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or their respective pecuniary positions be taken into consideration and,
if so, to what extent? How much weight should be given to the general
"impoverishment factor"? Again the practical results were bound to vary
according, for example, to whether the courts adopted the gold value of
the mark or wholesale price indices or, say, cost-of-living indices as the
standard of value to be used as a substitute for the abandoned paper mark.
-The difficulties and uncertainties which attended the task of the courts
hastened the enactment of legislation designed to establish a more definitive
pattern for the revision of various kinds of mark claims. The most com-
prehensive and elaborate statute was the Revalorization Act of July 16,
1925,'o which provided for the revaluation of several important classes
of obligations, including mortgages and debenture bonds, at a flat rate to
be computed on the original "gold value" of the claim.'3 In some cases
it even permitted the reopening of closed transactions and thus assumed
a retroactive character. On the other hand, some creditors, such as bank
depositors, were wholly barred of relief. Equitable adjustment of the
rights of individuals was reduced in importance, the statutory provisions
being rather molded, as the promotion of the inflation itself had been, in
conformity with what the groups in power chose to represent as the na-
tional interest of Germany.
The genesis of the Russian inflation differed from that of Germany.
Whereas Germany repudiated foreign debts through the debasement of the
mark, Russian foreign indebtedness was bluntly and directly annuled.
The major Russian inflation had no relation to foreign politics. Its pur-
pose was to serve as one of the means of destroying the economic forces
within Russia itself against which the Soviet Revolution had been directed.
It supplemented the confiscatory action which included, among other
measures, a prohibition forbidding the courts even to take jurisdiction of
monetary claims which had arisen before the Revolution." A remark by
Judge Crane in Parker v. Hoppe that in Russia "no account would have been
taken of depreciation" " should not be unqualifiedly accepted. The claim
there was for money paid in Russia before 1917 under a contract which had
since been rescinded; it was one which the Soviets undertook wholly to
extinguish and which, therefore, presented no occasion for considering
whether Soviet law ever took account of depreciation.
Because of the legal and economic situation established in Russia there
are only two classes of cases in which one may reasonably seek light on
the Russian attitude to the problem of revaluation: those concerning rela-
36. [1925J REicHSGESETZLATT 1. 117.
37. For mortgages of land, for instance, the basic rate of revaluation was 25 per cent
of the original "gold value" of the claim, and for debenture bonds 15 per cent.
38. Introductory decree to the Russian Civil Code of 1922, art. 2, 1 LES Co Es DE LA
RlssIE SoviftiQuE (Patouillet's and Dufour's trans., 1925) 121.
39. 258 N. Y. 365, 366, 179 N. E. 770 (1932).
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tions between governmental agencies and those arising out of employment
and other personal relationships. Illustrative of the first of these groups
is a decision of the Supreme Commission of Arbitration in 'Moscow, ren-
dered January 9, 1923, dealing with a delay by a governmental agency in
the payment of 300 million rubles of the issue of 1922.4 There it was
said: "When there is a precipitate fall in the value of money, any delay
in payment, if not appropriately compensated for, mieans not only a vio-
lation of the term prescribing the time for payment, but also an effectual
reduction of the stipulated amount, since the nominal amount, Which re-
mains unchanged, represents much less in purchasing power. The debtor
would thus derive a benefit from his delay and with no valid reain enrich
himself at the expense of the other party. The gaovernmental agency
which was in default was required to pay a sum computed on the , fficial
general index of prices and exceeding the nominal amount of the debt.
In cases involving claims for unpaid wages, and in i ither cases of the 'econd
group, similar considerations were applied and similar results readeld.41
When courts do not simply adjudge payment -f the amount nominally
due, with or without interest, but take into cunsiderati,,n without requir-
ing proof of actual damage the decline in the purchasing power #,4 the
ruble, the rule "a ruble is a ruble" is gone and. it is ubmitted. revaluati an
becomes practically established.4'
Poland, Rumania and Hungary likewise resort:d t, a revaluation devices;
Austria is an example of a country which refused to do so.
The problem of revaluation thus far considered a',,se in wholly int'rnal
situations in countries whose currency had hoaite ruined. I I-. waMuN
the courts of those same countries have treated claim. in a depreciated
currency other than their own? How, for example, wo uld the German
courts-have dealt with claims expressed in Russian a r in Polish or in .\us-
trian money? The answer depends, in the first place. aon whltttr the
courts would hold their own law or foreign law to be applicable. The rule
in this regard in revaluation cases is nowhere definitely settled. There is,
on the one hand, the theory of "the law of the currency"; under it. for
40. See AUSLANDSRECHT, Bit nr" F;ER 1:oermar e:t, H.:t, L, Xuj. S-9 (1923.
41. The Civil Department of the Supreme tourt 'f the Ukraiian Saj',rkt R-cloiblic
held, in 1923, that it would be an unpermissible exercise uf right for a debtor, in the alscnuce
of a stipulation that the debt should be computed on a gold basi5, tu shift tu tht: cri dttr
the entire loss resulting from a progressive deturioratkiu of currtic3. See M.vuztaj,
G.azn.isxn Kosacrs Sov-i-rsEtcH REsvsutia (The Civil Code of the Soviet R, eublizs)
(3d ed. 1927) 31. A number of interesting Russian cases were cited, although riot always
correctly interpreted, in Perry v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 45 T. L . 4,:S (K. D.
1929).
42. In theory, there is, of course, a marked difference betvcen the two situntiv.s in
which monetary depredation may be taken into account, namely, that in w:hich there
is an outright redefinition of a debt and that in which damages are awar cd for a
default in payment.
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example, claims in rubles would always be governed by Russian law.
There is, on the other hand, the theory of "the law of the contract"; un-
der it, claims in rubles would not necessarily be governed by Russian law.
In the field disputed by these-two theories there is a considerable twilight
zone of uncertainty.4"
There is no need to elaborate on the situation in which the courts apply
their own law. Nor are there basic difficulties when the foreign law held
applicable has developed rules of revaluation which are deemed fair by
the forum. Difficulty arises only when the foreign law does not have rules
which are so regarded. In countries which, after overcoming obstacles of all
kinds, have worked out legal principles of revaluation, an adequate system
of remedies for the victims of ruinous inflation has generally been consid-
ered an imperative requirement of justice. Illustrative is an extraordinary
occurrence which took place in Germany when powerful forces, which had
fostered the inflation and profited from, it, were preparing legislative action
expressly forbidding revaluation even by judicial decree. The Association
of the Judges of the German Supreme Court issued a solemn warning point-
ing out that the maintenance of the nominal parity of the mark would result
in widespread injustice, intolerable under a reign of law, and intimating that
the proposed legislation, if enacted, would be held invalid because immoral,
in conflict with good faith, and unconstitutional.44 In this same spirit,
judges who have espoused the cause of revaluation have repeatedly refused,
on grounds of public policy, to apply foreign law and to enforce foreign
judgments which denied relief that they regarded as mandatory. Thus the
German Courts refused to enforce a Danish judgment whereby a mortgage
on property in Denmark, which was payable in marks, was permitted to be
discharged by payment in paper marks in the nominal amount of the debt.
The judgment was declared by the German Supreme Court to be based on
"unethical grounds." 45
IV
Most countries have been spared, at least for generations, the sad experi-
ence of a major monetary catastrophe. There is in such countries no uni-
form view as to the revaluation of claims in a currency which has collapsed.
Let us glance first at countries where the courts have readily followed the
doctrine of revaluation. Switzerlafid is one example. Its courts, reputed for
their high standing, had much to do with claims in depreciated marks. When
43. See 3 NEUmEYER, INTERNATIONALES VERWALTUNGSRECHT (1930) pt. 2, 356-73,
and authorities there cited.
44. See (1924) 16 DEUTScHE RiCHTERZEITUN( 7.
45. German Reichsgericht, June 25, 1926, 114 R. G. Z. 171. Cf. Philonenko, Notes
stur les jugemtents alletnands jefusant 'exequatur aux jugcments itrangers de valorisaton
(1930) 57 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL (Clunet) 1064-82.
[Vol. 54: 1
19441 DEBTS IN COLLAPSED FOREIGN CURRENCIES 15
applying Swiss law, they arrived at a free revaluation similar to that arrived
at by German courts and similarly based on the paramount principle of good
faith and fairness. When resorting to the German law, they sometimes, it
is true, held particular provisions of German statutes to be contrary to Swiss
public policy; on the whole, however, they enforced those statutes.*" The
proposition that "a mark is a mark" was incidentally but bluntly character-
ized by the Swiss Federal Court as an "absurd' and "senseless" fiction.
4 7
On the other side of the world, the courts of China, striving more directly
than western courts to apply basic notions of natural justice, have dealt with
a series of ruble cases. The highest court of Peiping, Ta Li Yuan, repeatedly
took the position that a loss resulting from an extraordinary depreciation
of money, unforeseen by the parties, should not be cast on the creditor
alone. In a case involving the balance of a bank account in rubles this
court held that the loss should be equally divided and thus granted the
creditor revaluation to the extent of fifty per centAs This result may be com-
pared with that in an analogous case discussed at the beginning of this
article and dealing with liabilities of the same defendant, the Russo
Asiatic Bank, in which an eminent United States Circuit Court of Appeals
denied the creditor relief. 9
France, on the other hand, is an example of a country which has not
readily accepted the principle of revaluation. The importance of France
and the community of ideas which in many respects links it with the United
States justify further elaboration. The monetary incidents of the French
Revolution, with the endless flood of assignats and of mandats tcrri-
toriaux, brought about in France a determination to avoid in the future
any similar inflationary experience." The legal provisions of the Code
Napoleon subscribed to the sacrosanctity of the monetary system and the
immutability of the franc."' The importance of this dogma grew as the
masses of the French people, confident in the stable purchasing power
of money, strove more and more to put their francs into savings so that
they might become "rentiers" in their old age. The dogma was ineffectual,
46. See cases cited in GTiSAx, LA D9PniI.%TIoN Mo:zi.'TAIarm s u s Erurs In Dnoi
Civim (1934) 159 et scq.
47. Hinrichsen & Cie. v. Braun A. G., Swiss Trib. F6dral, June 3, 1925, 51 Recueil
Officiel II. 303, 310.
48. The.cases are reported and commented on by Professor Escarra in [192] Rizcu.u.
PtRioDiguE ET CRiTiquE (Dalloz) 2. 93, n. 1.
49. Tillman v. Russo Asiatic Bank, 51 F. (2d) 1023 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
50. An Attorney General of France said in 1816 that "repayments made in assignats
were an outright theft," that "to pay with paper is not to discharge the debtor's obligation
but to deprive the creditor of his right." See Mater, Des rgolements eu wonnaices effordres
on tendount a zero (1925) 3 REvuE Du DnoIT Ba.uc.%im 2, 5.
51. Of special interest is Article 1895 of the Cede Civil, which provides in substance
that the obligation created by a loan of money is always the numerical sum named in the
contract
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however, in preventing the depreciation of the franc; in the course of
twelve years, from 1914 to 1926, the year of the de facto stabilization of
the franc, it was reduced to a fifth or a sixth of its pre-war purchasing
power."' The law permitted rescission of pending contracts in special
cases only.3 Relief from hardships caused by the depreciation was pri-
marily arrived at in findings of fact by the lower courts, which, in so
far as they were the basis of awards of damages, were not subject to
review. When in an action for damages an increase in the price of goods
or services contracted for was traceable to a change in the value of money,
the lower courts simply refused to believe that the purchaser of the goods
or services in question had suffered substantial damage. They felt that
by paying a sum which was nominally larger, but which had the same
actual purchasing power, he could secure a substitute whose economic
value was intrinsically the same.54 Outright revision of prices, and a for-
tiori of simple debts, remained barred, however, on the whole. The ex-
perience of all countries shows that such revision does not become avail-
able until inflation is greatly advanced. The breaking point was not reached
in France; there was nothing there comparable to the German or Russian
inflation.
Application of French law was not limited to claims expressed in francs.
It so happened that the French courts had to apply French law in cases
involving depreciated marks or rubles. The great majority of mark cases,
in so far as they were not disposed of by the treaty of Versailles, orig-
inated in Alsace-Lorraine and were governed by the law that France
chose to keep or to introduce in her recovered provinces.5 Ruble cases,
on the other hand, called for the enforcement of Russian statutes which
in effect confiscated, or destroyed the very rights upon which the courts
had to pass; the French courts were not willing to permit these statutes
any legal effect in France and, therefore, resorted once more to their own
law.5
0
This background must be borne in mind for an understanding of deci-
sions which were inimical to the trend towards revaluation already de-
52. See DuLLEs, THE FRENCH FRANC (1929) 265 et seq., 511 et seq.
53. Compare CODE CIVIL, arts. 887, 1674 et seq. Special legislation permitting rescis-
sion is treated in 6 PLANIOL AND RI PERT, TRAITi PRATIQUE DE DRoIT CIVIL FRANCAIS
(1930) 549 et seq.
54. See, e.g., Trib. Comm., Seine, June 15, 1915, [1917] RECoEIL GANkRAL DES Lois
Er DEs ARR9TS (Sirey) 2. 49; French Cass. Req., March 15, 1920, [1920] id. 1. 117.
55. See, in particular, the monetary decrees for Alsace and Lorraine, BULLErIN OF-
FIClEL D'ALSACE ET DE LORRAINE, 1918, p. 8; 1919, p. 530.
56. Compare, e.g., the Ropit case, French Cass. Req., March 5, 1928, [1929] RECUmI.
G]-NtRAL DES Lois ET DES ARRP'TS (Sirey) 1. 217; [1928] REcUEIL PIRIODIQUE E-r CRITIQUE
(Dalloz) 1. 81, and see Note, Savatier, in id. 2. 49, 50 with further references.
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veloping elsewhere. In a test case in which the Socit6 Gn~rale Alsacienne
de Banque attempted to secure a revaluation of mark bonds of the City of
Strasbourg issued in 1901, the Cour d'Appel of Colmar took the position
"that the disappearance of mark money involves the destruction of a claim
expressed in marks and that, in the absence of any legal provision and in
the present state of the law, the courts are powerless to make good the loss
suffered by the creditor in consequence of manoavres which have caused
the complete depreciation of the mark." r1 Language similar to this, it
will be recalled, has been used'by American and English courts.
In France, as in other countries, the position thus taken eventually proved
unsatisfactory. Text writers, whose influence in France is great, soon
advocated a bolder approach to revaluation problems even with regard to
francs and, of. course, more emphatically with regard to moneys which
were more depreciated than the franc or which had wholly collapsed.
They presented an elaborate set of legal devices which would enable the
courts, if they desired, to give relief. Mention should le made especially of
books and articles by Professor Edouard Lambert, Director of the Insti-
tute of Comparative Law in Lyons,r' by Andr6 Mater, editor of the Revue
du Droit Bancaire," and by Georges Hubrecht c" and other lawyers asso-
ciated with the Rezz'e Jltridiqiw d'Alsacc et do Lorraine " which was par-
ticularly concerned with the subject. Their work did, not remain without
result. The French government itself seems to have anticipated the possi-
bility of an outright revaluation even of claims expressed in terms of
francs. A Franco-German treaty, ex pressly dealing with revaluation to
which France might resort, included a "most-favored-nation" clause to
the effect that with respect to this revaluation citizens of no country should
be more favorably treated than those of Germany.
Illustrative of the evolution in the attitude of the French courts are, in
particular, the mark cases with which local courts in Alsace-Lorraine had
57. Cour d'Appel, Colmar, Oct. 21, 1928. (1920 10 RVt'L JUiWi IiUtn iOAL:At% LT I.%
-LoRRAixE 25.
58. See LAmBR T, Detfes fixks ea wonnaic jfrangre-Ilys d: dreit coam:um if:lcr-
national sir Icur paiemcnt in Ux P,-R:RE tIE JURISVRU'ENcE CO i x MI-V k1934) 9.
59. See MATER, TrUXrt JURIDIt OLUP L. M(IN.NAIE- Fw nJ CHAuuc kl923,5 ard Des
ri'glements en monuaies effondrees ou tendant a cra (,1925) 3 RkEv v: D:UI BA-;-
cAIRE 2.
60. See HUBrEcHT, LA Dg9R RfC,TioN MuN tAIRE ur L'EXctX To:. t,.s CON:TATS:
STABILISATION DUJ FRANC ET VALIRISATION DES ChLANtMS (1913).
61. See Wilhelm, Stipulations en inonnaie dtpcr&i-Garanti contre los flactm.ins
dn dange (1924) 5 REVUE JurID19VI D'ALACZ ET DE L Ior.N 145; Gaudu, Valorisation
en Lorraine des comptes en marks, dtbitcurs on crditeurs (1927) 8 id. at 29.
62. See (1927) JoRNA. Diu Dnor INTErNATIONAL (Clunt) 1272; Dc.gand, Ch7an'ge,
Cours Forci, Monnaic de Paicmnt, I'alorisation in 3 Rervuiuo a- DLor l;u ,:aiuo:AL
(De Lapradelle and Niboyct, 1929) 231, §220.
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to deal. In effecting outright revaluation of legacies,0 3 leases, 0 and taxes,"0
they sometimes followed closely in their reasoning the doctrine of revalua-
tion. Thus a court in Strasbourg, in a case involving instalment payments
stipulated in marks, pointed out "that, in the absence of scaling laws,
resort should be had to the principles of general law; that, where no rule
of law expressly covers the case, the court, to arrive at a satisfactory solu-
tion, should decide er aequo et bono . . . and should look for a principle
which in some measure will protect both the interests of the debtor and
those of the creditor; that in 1924 the old mark was abolished in Germany;
that since that time it has been, therefore, impossible to establish a rela-
tion in value between the old German mark and the French franc; that
for reasons of equity one cannot say that, because of the abolition of the
old mark, the debtor should be completely freed of his obligation." 00 The
court accordingly revalued the litigated claim on the basis of the par value of
the mark.
Assimilation of the concept of revaluation was accelerated in the years
preceding the present war. It was as though the shadow of the impending
catastrophe brought to the French judges a more vivid understanding of
and feeling for the misfortunes and injustices caused by catastrophes
which previously had stricken other nations. The suggestion can perhaps
be ventured that an analogous psychological factor is now contributing
to bring about in the United States a greater awareness of the problem
dealt with in this article.
V
American law concerning collapsed foreign currencies must be viewed
in the light of cases arising from monetary inflations which this country
itself has experienced.
As to inflation in the colonial period it may suffice to refer to Deering
v. Parker,0 7 decided in 1760 by the Privy Council on an appeal from the
province of New Hampshire. The action was on a bond calling for pay-
ment in bills of the Massachusetts Bay Colony "or current lawful money
of New England." Since the bills of the Massachusetts Bay Colony had
in the meantime suffered severe depreciation and had been withdrawn, the
63. See, e.g., Cour d'Appel, Colmar, Nov. 2, 1926, (1927) 8 REVUE JuRwiQflu' AAsc
ET DE LoRRAINa 144.
64. See, e.g., Trib. Sup., Colmar, May 28, 1923, (1924) 5 REvuE JURIDIQUE D'ALSACfl
ET PE LORRAINE 31.
65. See, e.g., Conseil d'Ptat, Nov. 27, 1925, (1926) 7 REVUE JURIDIQUE D'ALSACE ar D9
LORRAINE 122.
66. See RL-PERTOIRE PRATI QUE DE DROIT Er DE JURISPRUDENCE D'ALSACE ET LORRAINE
(Niboyet, Sipp. for 1927, 1928) 17 et seq.
67. 4 Dall. x'iii (P. C. 1760).
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court, through Lord Mansfield, confessed that it was "at a loss" to deter-
mine the measure of recovery, and it finally decreed that the loss through
depreciation should be equally divided between the parties. It is interesting
to observe that the position of this great English judge was similar to that
taken in our day by a high Chinese court with respect to depreciated and
ultimately annulled Russian rubles."
With regard to the great depreciation of paper money issued during
the Revolution, it should be noted that statutory scales for the adjustment
of public and private debts were established by the Continental Congress
and by several of the states. 9 These scales were general in character and
were based primarily on current prices of gold. They did not take into
account the variable and diverging price relationships of a dislocated econ-
omy. The statutes themselves, therefore, often permitted departures from
the scales to permit fair results in particular cases. The Virginia scaling
act of 1781,70 for instance, authorized courts of equity to intervene and
to render "such judgment as shall appear to them just and equitable"
whenever the application of the general statutory scale would be "unjust";
the Pennsylvania " and MIaryland 72 statutes provided for resort to official
or private arbitrators.
The main body of American inflation cases originated in the Civil War
inflation with its two different aspects, the Northern and the Southern.
The Northern inflation occurred between 1862 and 1879, that is, in the
period between the suspension and the resumption cf specie payments.
The legal tender notes issued in 1862 and 1863, the so-called greenbacks,
soon depreciated,7 their value as compared with gold reaching its lowest
point in July, 1864, when $100 in gold was equivalent to $285 in the
paper money. In the greater part of the inflationary period, however, the
price of gold as well as of other commodities did not even double.7' The
inflation was thus a relatively moderate one.
The question relating to bilateral contracts calling for specific porfs or-
mance, which arises everywhere in time of inflation, soon arose alu in
the North. How far should unforeseen depreciation of money affect the
right of the obligee to require the performance contracted for? How far,
68. See note 48 supra.
69. See HARGREAvES, RESToRING Cunamncy STANDARDs (1921J) c. I.
70. Act of November, 1781, c. xxn, VA. STAT. (Henning, 1822) vol. 10, p. 471 [quoted
in Watson & Hartshorne v. Ale.xander, 1 Wash. 340 (Va. 1794)].
71. Act of April 3, 1781, PA. LAws (1812) c. 924, § 4, p. 519. See Hargreaves, op.
cit. supra note 69, at 13. See also Levan v. Frey, 2 Yeates 320 (Pa. 1793) ; Kennedy v. Ken-
nedy, 3 Yeates 15 (Pa. 1800).
72. See HARGREAvEs, op. cit. supra note 69, at 14.
73. See MrrcHEu, A HISTORY OF THE GRFx..NBcxs (1903).
74. See MITcHELL, GOLD, PRICES AND WAGES UNmE TEn GnE=A=Cr STAzD.Tm
(1908) 288 et scq.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
in other words, may the obligor take advantage of changed conditions re-
sulting in an inadequacy of consideration and refuse the performance for
which he has bound himself ?
The answer given in actions for specific performance by courts of equity
is familiar law. In the leading case of Willard v. Tayloe, 5 the complainant
exercised in 1864 an option to purchase contained in a lease of hotel prop-
erty in the city of Washington which had been executed in 1854. His
tender being rejected by the defendant, he filed a bill for specific perfor-
mance, submitting to the judgment of the court the amount he should pay.
The defendant 6bjected that the complainant's offer had been made in
greenbacks and not in gold, and also asserted that, because of a great
increase which had taken place in the value of the property, enforcement
of the contract would be inequitable. The decision, in the view of the
majority of the Supreme Court, turned on the power of courts of equity
to refuse specific performance on grounds of hardship and the correlative
power to attach conditions to the grant of specific performance when hard-
ship or injustice can thereby be prevented. The Court held that the parties
must be "considered as having taken upon themselves the risk of subsequent
fluctuations in the value of property." '6 The Court, however, took a dif-
ferent position with regard to the subsequent fluctuations in the value of
money, pointing out that, when the option was given, gold and silver coin
were the only currency recognized by law as legal tender, that the con-
tract must have had reference to such currency, and that it would be "in-
equitable" to substitute for it paper money worth only a little more than
half its value. "Such a substitution of notes for coin," said the Court,
"could not have been in the possible expectation of the parties. Nor is it
reasonable to suppose, if it had been, that the covenant would ever have
been inserted in the lease without some provision against the substitu-
tion."'  A decree was directed for a conveyance upon payment by the
plaintiff in gold or silver coin. Although the courts today may be more
readily disposed to hold that changes in the value of money lie within the
risks assumed by the parties to a contract, Willard v. Tayloe is still au-
thority for a "conscientious modification" of contractual terms when
monetary depreciation has taken place.
In some countries, as in Germany for example, specific enforcement is
at least in principle the primary form of relief for breach of contract.",
The question whether inadequacy of consideration caused by an interven-
ing depreciation of money may excuse the obligor from specific perfor-
75. 8 Wall. 557 (U. S. 1869).
76. Id. at 571.
77. Id. at 574.
78. "A person who is bound to make compensation shall bring about the condition
which would exist if the circumstance making him liable to compensate had not occurred."
GERMAN CIVIL CODE (Wang's trans. 1907) art. 249, § 1.
[Vol, 54: 1
1944J DEBTS IN COLLAPSED FOREIGN CURRENCIES 21
mance is there regularly equivalent to the question of whether he may be
permitted to rescind. The award of damages thus becomes a collateral
question and presents no basic difficulty. If the contract can be rescinded
by the obligor, he need not perform and there can be no claim against him
for damages. If it cannot be rescinded and is not performed, he is, of
course, liable in damages, and, if money has meanwhile fallen in value, it is
only reasonable that the damages in the depreciated currency be in an
amount which will enable the obligee to secure a substitute for the per-
formance contracted for.7 9
The situation under American law is quite different. Here specific en-
forcement of a contract is considered an "exceptional" remedy which lies
in the discretion of the court. Its grant or refusal does not depend simply
on the question of whether the contract stands or falls. Specific perfurmance
can be denied though no ground exists for rescission." It follows that
an action for damages for the breach of a contract may, as a rule, be
brought though specific enforcement in equity is barred by hardship. The
hardship may be no less, however, if in a case like WJ'illard -,. Tayloe the
purchaser, unsuccessful in equity, is permitted to pile up damages in an
action at law. This is one aspect of the fact that in the United States as
well as in countries such as France, where damages are the nurmal remedy
for breach of contract," the efficacy of relief against the results of mi ,netar-
depreciation must depend greatly on how far changes in the purchasing
power of money are taken into account by courts which assess damages.
Situations thius arising are twofold. It may he desirable on the one
hand to enhance, or on the other to reduce, the nominal am.,.unt of Iam-
ages awarded.
79. See cases discussed by Zeiler, Decnngskauf in der Inflatimsreit l'2,0j 55
JUMrSTISCHE WOCHENSCHaRFT 687.
80. "Indeed, in American law, although the creditor cannot enfi-rce specific prfir -
mance in such a case [Willard z,. Tayloe], he can recover the value of his bargain in an
action at law." PouND, LAW AND MORALS (1926) 99. See cases cited in Note, Eqitac
Contract Renedies-Dezial of Both Specific Performance and Rescission (1934) 32
Mlici. L. REv. 518.
Incidentally, at the time when Willard -. Tayloc %,as decided, rescision kcause of
intervening depreciation would not have beeii permitted anywhere. The dcdrine of
frustration in Anglo-American law, which seems to have originated in the language of
Blackburn, J., in Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B. & S. 826, 122 Eng. Rep. R. 369 (l 3), had not
yet been sufficiently developed. Cf. the so-called coronation cases, t W1LUsTUN, COMARcAMs
(rev. ed. 1938) § 1954, and Page, The Development of the Doctrine of Impossiblity of
Performnwe (1920) 18 MixcH. L. REv. 589, 600 et seq. As to foreign law, see, e.g., Kruel-
mann, supra note 27.
81. "Every obligation to do or not to do resolves itself in damages, in case of non-
performance on the part of the debtor." CoDo Cryn. (Cashard's trans. 1930), art. 1142.
Articles 1143 and 1144 modify only partly this sweeping provision.
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Ampng the cases in which the amount was enhanced is Cushing v. Wells,
Fargo,82 where a carrier failed to deliver a bag of double eagles re-
ceived by it in Mexico to be carried to the plaintiff in Massachusetts, and
the problem presented was whether the plaintiff's damages should be in
the amount of the gold coin or in the larger amount representing its value
in notes. Another illustration is Simpkhins v. Low,8 3 an action for the con-
version of bonds of the San Francisco Water Works Company. The bonds
did not express in what kind of money they were to be paid, but the plain-
tiff offered to show that, in conformity with the usage in California, the
company paid its bonds in gold. The question was whether the difference
between gold and paper currency could be recognized and damages awarded
in an amount higher than the face aniount of the bonds. In Spencer v.
Prindle 84 an action was brought by attorneys for the reasonable value of
services rendered. Witnesses estimated the value of the services both in
gold and in notes, raising the issue of whether the jury was at liberty to
take.the difference into consideration and to base its verdict on the higher
estimate which had been given in notes. 'The legal tender acts provided,
it is true, that the notes whose issue was authorized should be "lawful
money and a legal tender in payment of all debts, public and private, within
the United States." 85 Nevertheless the courts felt in the cases just cited
and in many others, as did later the courts of other countries,80 that the
process whereby the amount of an obligation was determined was another
matter and was not governed by such a provision. "While in legal con-
templation there is no difference in value between the different kinds of
lawful money, there is a difference, in fact, recognized in the commercial
world." 87 The technique of valuation which in actions for damages sub-
jects the standard of value itself to scrutiny and permits enhancement of
the plaintiff's recovery in a period of progressive decline in the purchasing
power of money was widely adopted.
The question not of enhancing but of reducing the amount of damages
may arise when an action for damages is brought by a purchaser of land
or goods after a depreciation in the value of money has caused a great dis-
crepancy between the contract price and the present value of the subject
matter. This question would, for example, come up in an action at law
by the purchaser in a situation like that of Willard v. Tayloe. Although
with the crystallization of the rules of damages the "equitable powers"
of juries decreased, it is still true that, in some measure, "a jury, in a court
82. 98 Mass. 550 (1868).
83. 54 N. Y. 179 (1873).
84. 28 Cal. 276 (1865).
85. Exceptions were made with regard to duties on imports owed to the United States
and interest on bonds and notes due from the United States. 12 STAT. 345, 532, 709 (1862-63).
86. Compare supra p. 10 et seq.
87. Spencer v. Prindle, 28 Cal. 276, 277-8 (1865).
1944] DEBTS IN COLLAPSED FOREIGN CURRENCIES 23
of law, can mitigate the damages according to equity and good consci-
ence." 88 This process applied outside the frame of any strict legal rule
seems to have proved as a practical matter to be adequate. It will be re-
called that in France the depreciation suffered by the franc some twenty
years ago was more than twice as great as the depreciation of the greenbacs
and that there, too, no other avenue of relief was in general available."
From the Northern inflation cases it is at any rate clear that in the ad-
justment of difficulties resulting from a depreciation of money as mod-
erate as that of the greenbacks the American courts were in no respect less
efficient, and in some respects more efficient, than the courts of other count-
tries. These cases, however, do not show the resources of American law for
coping with a more advanced inflation or with an inflation ending in a
total collapse of the monetary standard which might require an outright
revision of monetary obligations. Light is thrown on that subject by the
Southern inflation cases.
For more than a year, the notes issued by the Confederate government
clung closely to their parity with gold. Thereafter they depreciated, in
successive six-month intervals, to one-half, one-fourth and one-twelfth of
their pre-war gold value, sinking, by January, 1865, to less than one-
fiftieth. Four months later, with the defeat of the Confederacy, they were
wholly worthless.
Some of the reconstruction courts reasoned that all contracts in which
Confederate money was used for any purpose were illegal and unenforce-
able,91 but this doctrine was rejected by the Supreme Court of the United
States. In 1868, in Thorington v. Szith1, 2 the Court declared that the
Confederate currency was imposed on the community by irresistible force
throughout the vast territory in which the Confederate government exer-
cised de facto power and that contracts stipulating payment in this
currency were transactions "in the ordinary course of civil society" and
were "without blame" except when proved to have been entered into with
actual intent to further the insurrection. "We cannot doubt," concluded
the Court, "that such contracts should be enforced in the courts of the
United States, after the restoration of peace, to the extent of their just
obligation." 1 low was "the extent of their just obligation" to be ascer-
88. See Savage, C. J., in Seymour v. Delancy, 3 Cow. 445,504e seq. (N. Y. 1824).
89. See supra p. 16.
90. See ScmWvB, THE Cormtr..Ta STAyS oF A=ncA (1901) 167 and app. I.
91. See, e.g., Lawson v. Miller, 44 Ala. 616 (1870) ; Carilee v. Carlton, 27 Ariz. 379
(1872) ; Baily v. Milner, 35 Ga. 330 (16S) ; Laughlin v. Dean, 1 Duvall (62 Ky.) 20
(1863); Denney v. Johnson, 26 La. Ann. 55 (1874) ; Robertson v. Shores, 47 Tem. 164
(1869) ; Brown v. Read, 33 Tex. 629 (1870) ; Calfee v. Burgess, 3 W. Va. 274 (I69).
92. 8 Wall. 1 (U. S. 1868).
93. In Delmas v. Insurance Co., 14 Wall. 661 (U S. S171), the Supreme Court even
held that state legislation invalidating Confederate-money contracts was an impairment of
their obligation and was therefore violative of the Federal Constitution.
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tained, however, in currency of the United States when this had again
become the only currency in the land? Debts contracted in Confederate
dollars were not required to be paid in an equal amount of dollars of the
United States. Parties were permitted to show, by parol or other evidence,
that "dollars" meant Confederate dollars. But it did not follow that a
great mass of debts were now dischargeable in wholly worthless notes.
Statutes were enacted in the greater part of the Southern states which
called for a process essentially the same as that of the revaluation under-
taken more recently in Germany and in other countries. 4 Most of these
statutes conferred broad discretion on the trial courts. In Georgia, for
instance, either party to a suit involving a Confederate-money contract was
at liberty to "give in evidence the consideration and the value theredf. at
any time, and the intention of the parties as to the particular currency in
which payment was to be made, and the value of such currency at any
time," the statute adding that the "verdict and judgment rendered shall
be on principles of equity." 91 In states where there were no statutes on
the subject,98 courts proceeded on the basis of general principles of private
law, as did also, on occasion, the federal courts.
Neither legislatures nor courts undertook to reopen executed ,transac-
tions. Debts which originated before the war and which were paid during
the war were regarded as discharged; '8 if they remained unpaid they were
enforceable in accordance with their terms. The problem was thus nar-
rowed to an adjustment of Confederate-money debts which at the end of
the Civil War remained unpaid in whole or in part. Most of the cases in-
volved promises to repay loans,09 or to pay for land,1"' goods sold,101 or
services rendered.
10 2
94. Compare especially Alabama Ordinance No. 26 of Sept. 28, 1865, § 3, REV. CODE
(1867), p. 59; Florida Ordinance No. 8 of Nov. 7, 1865, Acts 1865, p. 153 [quoted in Fife v.
Turner, 11 Fla. 289, 291 (1867)]; Georgia Ordinance of Nov. 8, 1865, in JOURNAL OF
THE GEORGIA CONVENTION (1865) 232; South Carolina Ordinance of Sept. 27, 1865
[quoted in headnote of Rutland v. Copes, 15 Rich. Law 84 (S. C. 1867)]; Virginia Act
of March 3, 1866, Acts 1865-66, c. 71.
95. Georgia Ordinance of Nov. 8, 1865, loc. cit. supra note 94.
96. Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee.
97. In Thorington v. Smith, 8 Wall. 1 (U. S. 1868), and in Stewart v. Salamon,.94
U. S. 434 (1876), where actions had been brought in Federal District Courts for Alabama
and Georgia, respectively, it was nowhere suggested that the scaling acts in force in
those states would have any bearing on the decisions.
98. Ponder v. Scott, 44 Ala. 241 (1870); Van Hoose v. Bush, 54 Ala. 342 (1875);
Glenn v. Case, 25 Ark. 616 (1869); Roggers v. Gibbs, 25 La. Ann. 563 (1873) ; Pope v.
Chafee, 14 Rich. Eq. 69 (S. C. 1868) ; Binford v. Memphis Bulletin Co., 57 Tenn. 355 (1872);
Jones v. Thomas, 45 Tenn. 465 (1868) ; Ritchie v. Sweet, 32 Tex. 333 (1869).
99. See, e.g., Rives v. Duke, 105 U. S. 132 (1881); Taylor v. Turley, 33 Md. 500
(1870) ; Wooten v. Sherrard, 71 N. C. 374 (1874).
100. See, e.g., Slaughter v. Culpepper, 35 Ga. 25 (1866) ; Herbert & Gessler v. Easton,
43 Ala. 547 (1869) ; Austin v. Kinsman, 13 Rich. Eq. 259 (S. C. 1867).
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The decisions were by no means uniform, but the differences, on the
whole, did not result from the presence or absence of a statute. The fact
that many of them were based on statutes had, however, the impourtant con-
sequence that, when the constitutionality of these statutes was challenged,
the Supreme Court had to deal with two questions, decisive in the revision
of debts expressed in the collapsed currency: what was to be taken as the
standard when the original standard, the Confederate dollar, had become
inoperative, and as of what date was that standard, and consequently the
obligation, to be evaluated?
The import of the first question must be considered in the light of the
economic conditions which had prevailed in the South during the war.103
There was traffic in notes of the United States, but for long periods this
was secret as well as illicit. There was traffic in gold, but this, although
lawful, was also greatly distorted, for gold was itself the principal object
of speculation. The prices of commodities moved in separate courses.
The prices of cotton, tobacco and rice, which because of the blockade could
not be exported, rose slowly. The prices of other products, particularly
those coming from abroad, rose enormously. Owing to deficiencies in
transportation there was also wide disparity in the prices of basic com-
modities between one district and another and between city and country in
the same district. In these circumstances it proved extremely difficult
to redefine after the war in terms of lawful money an amount contracted
for in Southern currency.
As a matter of fact, the greater part of the indebtedness left over from
the Confederate period and liquidated in the state courts was adjusted on
the basis, not of the amount of Confederate dollars promised, but of the
value of the consideration which had been given. 10- An example of this is
Effinger v. Kenney. " A tract of about one hundred acres of land in Vir-
ginia was sold in March, 1863, at $210 per acre in Confederate money.
One-third of the price was made payable two years after the date of the
sale. In an action for this balance of the purchase money the Virginia
courts, as authorized by a Virginia statute, held that the fair value of the
property "was the most just measure of recovery" and, disregarding the
price fixed by the parties, awarded judgment for one-third the value of
101. See, e.g., Calbreath v. Virginia Porcelain and Earthenware Co., 22 Gratt. 697
(Va. 1872); 1axwell v. Hipp, 64 N. C. 9S (1870).
102. See, e.g., Fife v. Turner, 11 Fla. 289 (1867).
103. See ScHwAB, Ta CoNxEmDEATE STTES OF A-imincA (1901) 161 et Teq.
104. The value of the consideration was even expressly adopted by some state statutes
as the measure of recovery. AL.. Ray. CoDE (1867), p. 59, § 3; Fla. Acts 185, Ord. No. 8,
p. 153; Ga. Ord. of Nov. 8, 1865, loc. cit. supra note 94; N. C. Pub. Acts 1865-C6, c. 39;
S. C. Ord. of Sept. 27, 1865, loc. cit mtpra note 94; Va. Act uf Feb. 28, 187, Acts 1& 5-67,
c. 270.
105. 115 U. S. 566 (1S5).
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the land, which on the basis of tax assessments and other factors was esti-
mated to be $80 an acre in lawful currency.
This "consideration test" would probably not have been questioned if
creditors could have rescinded and proceeded on the theory of quantum
valebat or quantum reruit. The test was bound to arouse objections since
there was no rescission, creditors, on the contrary, standing on their con-
tracts. The Supreme Court took the position in Effinger v. Kenney, as it
had done earlier in Wilmington & Weldon Railroad v. King,"'0 that to
use the "consideration test" in determining the value of a contract and
computing damages for its breach was "nothing less" than to "put a dif-
ferent value upon the property from that placed by the parties" and to
"make for them new and different contracts." The Court declared that
state statutes which permitted recovery of the fair value of the considera-
tion given whenever the court might think that this would be "the most
just measure of recovery" sanctioned the impairment of contracts and
thus violated the Federal Constitution. It was held that, within the ordi-
nary rules of the law of contracts, creditors could only be permitted to re-
cover the value, in lawful money of the United States, of the Confederate
money promised. The Court did not attach decisive importance to the
difficulties which the trial courts might encounter in determining this
value.
If the valuation was thus to be based not on the consideration given but
on the amount of Confederate money promised, the question of the date
as of which the valuation was to be made became of paramount importance.
The ordinary rules of damages would seem to require that the value of
the Confederate money be measured as of the date on which the debt was
made payable by the terms of the contract. From this it would follow, of
course, that the creditor would have to bear the entire loss arising out
of any supervening depreciation of money. Since the depreciation of Con-
federate notes was rapid and eventually complete, this frequently would
amount to a denial of any recovery. This, however, was precisely the
result which, it was generally felt, was to be avoided. Governed by this
feeling, the overwhelming majority of the state courts took. not the ma-
turity date, but the date of the inception of the debt as the date of
the valuation.' The Supreme Court, far from barring this inno-
vation as it had barred the "consideration test," sanctioned the choice of
the earlier date. Thorington v. Smith, 08 the first case in which the Court
touched on the subject, involved a promissory note given as a part of the
106. 91 U. S. 3 (1875).
107. See, e.g., Darcey & Wheeler v. Shotwell, 49 Miss. 631 (1873); Cowan v. Mc-
Cutchen, 43 Miss. 207 (1870); Mathews v. Rucker, 41 Tex. 636 (1874) ; and cases cited
supra notes 99-102.
108. 8 Wall. 1 (U. S. 1868).
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purchase price of land and made with reference to Confederate currency.
The note, as it happened, was payable one day after the date of the con-
tract of sale and consequently the choice between the date of the maturity
and that of the inception of the debt was, for practical purposes, imma-
terial. This may explain why the Court did not elaborate on its statement,
by no means self-evident and in reality far-reaching, that a party entitled
to be paid in Confederate dollars could recover their actual value "at the
time and place of the contract." 109 Some of the Southern courts took up
this statement 110 and in the Supreme Court itself the date of the contract
was subsequently adopted without further discussion in several cases."'
In one of these there was a period of a year between the making of the
contract and the maturity of the debt,112 with the result that the choice of a
date was material.
The rule became firmly established. Yet when in Efflnger v. Kenney,
seventeen years after Thorington v. Smith, the question was seriously con-
troverted, the Supreme Court had some difficulty in justifying the rule.
The Court based its decision on the fact that Confederate notes were not
lawful currency nor even a recognized subject of property. "Their in-
trinsic value," said Mr. Justice Field, who delivered the opinion, "was
nothing but their exchangeable value by reason of their enforced circula-
tion.... Persons... parting with lands and goods for Confederate notes,
or for the promise of them, attached to them this exchangeable value, and
expected to receive it then or afterwards. They did not intend to sur-
render . . . their property without any consideration, if the . . . notes
[should] lose this exchangeable value. They expected an equivalent in
any event. Therefore, as having the value thus given to them at the time
and place of their receipt, or the promise of them, the National courts will
treat them, but not as having a value at any other time or place." "' What-
ever may be said of this reasoning, the result of all the decisions was that
Confederate-money debts were computed in terms of the value they had
when they arose. They were, in other words, subjected tu revaluation, and,
it should be noted, to a more radical revaluation than has since been ar-
rived at in any other country.
In the cases dealing with the revaluation of Confederate-money debts,
there was, of course, no occasion for ruling on questions which might
arise out of an extreme depreciation of lawful money. In Efflngcr v. Ken-
109. Id. at 14.
110. Neely v. McFadden, 2 S. C. (x. s.) 169 (1870); Brightwdll v. Hoover, 7 W. Va.
342 (1874).
111. Wilmington & Weldon R. R. v. King, 91 U. S. 3 (1875); Stewart v. Salamon,
94 U. S. 434 (1876) ; see also Bissell v. Heyward, 96 U. S. 580 (1877).
112. Stewart v. Salamon, 94 U. S. 434 (1876).
113. 115 U. S. 566, 576 (1885).
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ney, before stating the doctrine adopted by the Court with regard to money
issued by "an insurgent and revolutionary organization," Mr. Justice
Field, it is true, remarked, by way of dictum, that "where a contract is
payable in a specified currency, the rule is ... clear that such currency [if
lawful] is demandable and receivable at the maturity of the contract,
whatever change in its value by increase or depreciation may have taken
place in the meantime" and that in such a case "the damages recoverable
for a breach of the contract are to be measured by the value of the cur-
rency at its maturity." 114 It is a peculiar feature, however, of the law
dealing with inflation that rules appropriate at an early stage of inflation
become wholly impracticable when the inflationary process is greatly ad-
vanced. Mr. Justice Field's statement, it is submitted, must have been
made with reference to the then prevailing moderate fluctuations in Amer-
ican currency and the then common practice of specifying a particular kind
of currency in contracts, and by no means with reference to such an even-
tuality as an utter collapse of lawful money. To regard his statement as
applicable to this latter situation would, indeed, be at variance with a
further observation which he made. After reaffirming the revaluation
rule with respect to contracts made payable in Confederate money, he
remarked that "any other rule . . . would be inconsistent with justice in
determining the value of contracts thus payable where they matured near
the close or after the overthrow of the Confederacy." I'l Clearly, if the
collapsed currency were a lawful and not an unlawful currency, any other
rule would be no less inconsistent with justice. The equities as between
private parties engaged in transactions "in the ordinary course of civil
society" are in both situations the same; if there be any difference, it is
rather in favor of one who contracted for money of a lawful and not a
merely de facto government. The dicta of the Supreme Court, viewed in
their entirety, should therefore be regarded as intimating that, whenever
monetary depreciation becomes catastrophic, the ordinary rules of appor-
tionment of risks between the parties become inadequate, and different
rules must be devised if justice or good faith or fairness-whatever the
term that may be used-is to prevail.
If, for the sake of argument, a collapse of the American dollar could be
assumed, the resources of American law no less than those of the law of
other countries would afford ample means for giving creditors appropriate
relief. There is hardly a device used in this field in a foreign country
which could not also be fitted into the American legal system. It may
suffice, however, to rely on a doctrine which has been more fully devel-
oped in the United States and in England than anywhere else-the doctrine
of constructive conditions. Parties frequently stipulate in a contract that
114. Id. at 575.
115. Id. at 576.
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the extent of the obligation shall be adapted in a specified manner to chang-
ing circumstances, that, for example, the nominal amount of a debt shall
be increased with a rise in prices. It rny therefore be permissible to hold
that a proviso making a particular event such as a rise in prices operative as
a condition should be implied by law when "the court believes that the parties
would have intended it to operate as such if they had thought about it at
all." "'6 The law "has thus in every country supplied the shortsightedness
of individuals by doing for them what they would have done for them-
selves if their imagination had anticipated the march of nature." 1T7 This
process, it should be noted, is quite distinct in principle from the theory,
frequently adopted by the Southern courts but condemned by the Supreme
Court of the United States, that courts may be empowered by statute to
disregard contractual stipulations made by the parties and, independently
of their intention, express, presumed, or implied, to "make for them new
and different contracts." 1s
Legal tender legislation would interpose no obstacle to revaluation.
Such legislation, properly construed, can scarcely be held to require that
dollar notes shall still be legal tender for the payment of debts even if,
contrary to all expectation, they actually are no longer worth the paper
on which they are printed. Legal tender acts of other countries have
already been construed as precluding the possibility of such an intention.'"
Moreover, a contrary construction of American legislation, forcing cred-
itors to give up their claims in return for wholly worthless "dollars," might
perhaps be regarded as depriving them of property without due process
of law. The decisive point, however, is that legal tender legislation deals
only with the discharge of debts and not with the fixing of their amount
and is, therefore, not the controlling factor in the process of revaluation.'
If the problem of a revaluation of dollar claims became acute, relief
would depend, not on whether means of relief can be found, but on whether
American courts, as a matter of policy, would deem it appropriate to pro-
ceed with the remedy of revaluation. An uninhibited revision of monetary
obligations is not to be expected. The prevailing nominalistic concept of
money, rooted as it is in economic as well as legal considerations, would
permit a debtor, regardless of any change in the value of money, to dis-
charge his obligation by paying the nominal amount of the debt. Those,
116. See Corbin, Conditions in the Law of Contract (1919) 28 Y,%u, L. J. 739, 744.
117. BENTHAM., A Gcncral Vicz, of a Complete Code of Lazs, in 3 \VoGns. oF
JEREmY BENTrHAM, (1843) 155, 191, spealdng of "adjective" obligations, i.e., those turn-
ing on "events which they [the parties] could not foresee."
118. Wilmington & Weldon R. R. v. King, 91 U. S. 3, 4 (1875); Eflinger v. Kenney,
115 U. S. 566, 572 (1885).
119. See supra pp. 10-11.
120. "The legal tender acts do not attempt to make paper a standard of value." Kno.%
v. Lee (the second legal-tender case), 12 Wall. 457, 553 (U. S. 1870).
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however, who would rely on this concept to bar revaluation even in an ex-
treme situation might be compared to natives of North Africa whom
Professor Huger W. Jervey saw gathered in a market place in Marrakech
seeking in the Koran the answer to practical questions of aviation. As a
matter of fact, no theory of nominalism was ever formulated with refer-
ence to emergency situations arising out of a monetary collapse. The
theory of nominalism, as was observed by Sulkowski, a Polish scholar,
in his lectures at the International Academy of the Hague, "is in reality
justified only in cases where variations [in the value of money] are not
substantial. Whenever they exceed certain maximum limits--limits which
are unstable and which vary according to time and circumstances-un-
deviating application of nominalism must be rejected as contrary to the
principles of equity and justice." 121 Special rules must then be applied,
as was done after the Southern inflation, which take account of realities
and restore, in whole or in part, the original value of debts.
Troublesome difficulties may arise in border situations.2 2 In the event,
however, of an utter collapse of money, in which contracts, in the words
of Mr. Justice Field, could not otherwise be enforced "with anything like
justice to the parties," 12' it is reasonable to suppose that a revaluation
device of some kind would be adopted by the American courts.
VI
Unlike the hypothetical situation arising from a collapse of the dollar,
future cases involving claims in collapsed foreign currencies will force
the courts of the United States to decide to what law they will look in
determining the extent of the obligation of contracts expressed in terms
of the vanished currency. No doctrine in this regard having been devel-
oped in the United States, it can only be said that this question goes to
the substance of the obligation, and not to its performance, and that the
courts, according to the varying circumstances of the particular cases, will
in effect apply sometimes their own law and sometimes the foreign law.
Both possibilities, therefore, must be considered.
Under American law, as has already been shown, the American courts
could be expected to give creditors appropriate relief if there were a col-
lapse of American money. The grounds on which that conclusion was
121. See Sulkowski, Questions juridiques souievges dans les rapports internationaux."
par les variations de valeur des signes monitaires (1929) 29 RECUmL DES CouRs (Acaddmie
de Droit International) 5, 26.
122. Difficulty may arise especially from the necessity of distinguishing between a
mere depreciation and a collapse of the currency. The distinction, like most questions of
degree, is hazy in theory; in actual practice, there can rarely be any question as to where
a case falls. See, e.g., cases cited in Nussmum, MONEY IN TH, E LAW (1939) 291, n. 33,
123. Wilmington & Weldon R. R. v. King, 91 U. S. 3, 4 (1875).
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reached are not at all peculiar to a domestic monetary catastrophe; they
are wholly applicable to claims in a collapsed foreign currency. Indeed,
in the balancing of conflicting interests any disposition to maintain nominal
parity would have less weight in the latter situation, and the considerations
demanding an equitable adjustment of contractual rights and obligations
would have greater weight. Courts are naturally disposed to uphold as far
as possible the iiominal parity of the money of their own country wheq
they believe that to do so would conform with some national policy. A
moderate debasement of money is generally brought about for purposes of
policy; it may, for instance, be designed to facilitate the competition of
a nation's products in foreign markets. An extreme depreciation of money,
although bound to bring about results which, as to private relations, are
completely at variance with justice, may still be sanctioned by the state.
A state which sends its soldiers into battle may demand that contractual
rights be sacrificed if this is deemed to be required by superior interests.
Yet, as the state drafts for military service only those who owe allegiance
to it, so the extraordinary exigencies which demand a sacrifice of con-
tractual rights will appear less imperative outside the nation's domain.
When, on the other hand, courts have been disposed to adjust contractual
obligations, it has been because of the extent to which they have been
shocked by the damage resulting to individuals when money loses its
value. Such damage does not, in general, fall equally on domestic and
on foreign creditors. The money, although diminished in its foreign e=-
change value, may still retain its purchasing power at home. Thus, in
one of the gold clause cases, 4 the Supreme Court pointed out that the
plaintiff, the owner of a Liberty Loan bond, had not shown that he suf-
fered any loss by reason of the devaluation of the dollar and the abroga-
tion of the gold clause. In the event of a depreciation which unquestionably
results in widespread and ruinous losses, claims for revaluation assL-rted
by creditors outside the country may still be properly regarded as more
meritorious than claims of persons who belong to the country and who
may be supposed to have derived at least some indirect benefit therefrom.
Why, for example, in litigation in an American court between two Amer-
icans who contracted in francs, should the result be controlled, not by
rules of private law relating to the assumption of risks, but by rules rooted
in French public law concerned with the circulation of franc notes in
France? From all this it follows that, if American law governs, relief
should be more readily available to holders of claims in collapsed foreign
money than it would be to holders of claims in collapsed American dollars.
In cases in which the foreign law is held applicable, three situations are
conceivable: first, that the foreign law gives adequate relief from hard-
124. Perry v. United States, 294 U. S. 330 (1935).
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ships arising out of a monetary collapse; second, that it gives inadequate
relief; third, that it gives no relief at all.
If, in the foreign law, rules for revaluation have been developed which
are deemed fair, the American courts should have no basic difficulty in
applying them. In an English case 12 which was held to be governed by
German law, the plaintiff was entitled to an annuity of 8,000 marks tinder
a compromise between legatees which had been approved in 1905 by the
German courts. Meanwhile the German currency had collapsed and had
been re-established. The Chancery Division found as "a fact that the result
of the German law is that the sum which has to be paid under a contract
of this sort is such a sum as a man would feel himself under an obligation
to pay, having regard to the original liability, having regard to the circum-
stances, and assuming the man to be honest and acting in good faith, and
taking all proper circumstances into consideration." 120 The court held
that the plaintiff was not entitled to 8,000 reichsmark of the new German
currency (which would have been worth £646) but was entitled, under the
principles of free revaluation, to £500 per annum.
If the revaluation rules of the foreign law are deemed so unfair as to be
against the public policy of the forum-if, as Mr. Justice Cardozo put it,
they violate "some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent con-
ception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal" I2"
-we may well assume that the courts will refuse to apply them. It is rather
to be expected that the courts will, instead, consider the foreign law as
though it did not contain the objectionable rules and will, in some circum-
stances, project domestic rules into the foreign legal system -.12  The de-
sirability of using the exclusionary device of public policy in other than
exceptional cases has sometimes been disputed by those striving for the
"illusion of certainty" to which Mr. Justice Holmes has so frequently
referred. Still, the notion of public policy is no less definite than is, for
example, the concept of reasonableness, the importance of which in the
legal technique is beyond question. It would be strange, moreover, if the
courts, although permitted to determine whether their own statutes are
at variance with guaranties of the Constitution, were, nevertheless, for-
bidden to consider,. in the language of Mr. Justice Story, whether, "in a
moral or political view," foreign laws which they are asked to enforce are
"incompatible" with the nation's "own safety or happiness or conscientious
regard to justice and duty."' 9 Even one who puts a coin in a slot machine
125. Kornatzki v. Oppenheimer [1937] 4 All Eng. 133 (Ch.) ; see also In re Scbiap-
per, Westminster Bank Ltd. v. Sclnapper [1936] 1 All Eng. 322 (Ch.).
126. Kornatzki v. Oppenheimer [1937] 4 All Eng. 133, 139 (Ch.).
127. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99, 111, 120 N. E. 198, 202 (1918).
128. For a fuller discussion of the exclusionary device of public policy and of its
application in related fields, see Rashba, Foreign Exchange Restrictions and Putblic Policy
if the Conflict of Laws (1943) 41 MicH. L. Rav. 777, 1089.
129. STORY, CONFLiCr OF LAWS (7th ed. 1872) 24.
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can ordinarily ask for replacement if what he receives is unfit for use.
Should the judges who operate the mechanism of the conflict of laws have
to accept, "as is," what the mechanism yields? "-"
How necessary it may be to apply the test of public policy in the field
of revaluation is illustrated by a provision in the comprehensive German
statute of July 16, 1925.131 This statute, after providing specifically for
the revaluation of mortgages, debenture bonds, savings bank deposits, and
claims against insurance companies, states in Title Nine that other obliga-
tions shall be governed by general principles of law,1" that is to say, by
the principles of so-called free revaluation. Yet in the same title, by way of
exception, holders of claims against commercial banks are wholly excluded
from the benefit of revaluation. 3  Although German banks were sub3tan-
tially indebted to Americans there appears to be no case in which Ameri' an
creditors sought revaluation of their claims.13 4 Unless they simply over-
looked the possibility of revaluation in general, this can be explained only
by their having acquiesced in what the Germans themselves called the
"Bankenprivileg." When this special privilege was discussed in the Reichs-
tag, however, and several deputies protested that German public opinion
would not understand why the banks, which in time of inflation had
charged exceedingly high interest rates and had erected magnificent edi-
fices, should be specially favored, the German Minister of Economy re-
peatedly made it clear that one of the principal reasons for the exemption
was that any revaluation of bank claims would, in greater part, profit for-
eigners.3 5 Such an enactment, if its true nature were once shov.-i, would
probably be disregarded by an American court." 0
130. It may also be noted that in judicial opinions, as %%dl as in the teaching of the
subject, the basic differences between the interstate and the international situations have
not always been taken fully into account. It is one tfhing to advocate that public policy, in
Professor Goodrich's phrase, be "cast out altogether" in the area of interstate conflicts;
it is another thing to do so when laws of foreign nations are involved.
131. [1925] REICESGESnrZBLATr I. 117.
132. Id. at arts. 62-6.
133. Id. at arts. 65-6.
134. As to cases before the Mixed Claims Cumiission, sce Repurt uf Robart W.
Bonynge, Agent of the United States, before the Mixed Claims Commissi-kn, United States
and Germany (1934), especially pp. 82 et seq.; Hearings before a Subcom: tce of the
House Committee on Ways and Means on H. R. 10820, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926),
especially pp. 234 et seq.
135. See WIuDi'RmcH, DiE RECHTSPOLITISCHE UND wmnTscu.%micaI BEE"ZTUf;G
Dos AUFWERTUNGSGESETZ; Protocols of the 18th commission, Documents of
the Reichstag, Nos. S04, 1125, especially p. 26; LEu-iA-BoEsuucex, KorxmmTAr zu-t
AUSVWERTUNGSGESETZ 310 et s q.
136. The Reichsgericht itself disregarded the bank privilege of Article 65, and granted
free revaluation, in an action against a non-German bank in which, although the debt vas
expressed in depreciated Austrian kronen and was governed by non-German law, it un-
dertook to apply German law. Cf. supra p. 14. The Reich.geridit rvmarh.d "that
the decisive motives for the provision of Article 65 of the Revalo'rizatiun Act could rut L2
determined with certainty." (1932) 61 JuaisnscHE WccHmxscusnnr 1043, 1049 n.
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The third possibility, somewhat related to the second, is that the law of
the foreign country does not permit any revaluation of claims in its collapsed
money. Monetary collapse can probably never be regarded simply as an ex-
tralegal event, a sort of natural catastrophe. It cannot occur unless the state
has permitted an over-issue of paper money or has otherwise taken away its
value.137  Let us imagine, for the sake of illustration, that an American
government, with a view to liquidating the onerous obligations incurred
during the war, were to bring it about that only obligations in some kind
of "new" dollars should thenceforth be valid whereas obligations in "old"
dollars should be worthless; such an imaginary domestic situation may
perhaps present more vividly than situations which have actually occurred
in foreign countries the fact that when a state deprives its money of all
value, and does not take reasonable measures for relieving holders of 'claims
expressed in the vanished currency, its action amounts to a confiscation of
such claims. 3 ' Confiscatory measures have repeatedly been adopted in
137. Recent major inflations, at any rate, were even deliberately organized. Schacht's
predecessor in the office of president of the Reichsbank, von Havenstein, suggested in secret
meetings with German political leaders that the Allied occupation of the Ruhr should be
countered with a destruction of the German currency and that this incidentally would
enable Germany to get rid of a large part of its private debts to foreign creditorp. [Pro-
fessor Georg Bernhard, who was a member of the Reichstag and of the Reichswirtschaftsrat
and who participated in the meetings, told these facts to the writer and authorized him to
publish them.] Indeed, the German commercial banks would scarcely have granted to
industrialists and others practically unlimited credits in a steadily depreciating money, and
inundated the country with paper, if they had not been certain that the Reichsbank, ithat
is to say, the Reich itself, would by rediscounting save them from loss. Cf. GRAHAM, Ex-
CHANGE, PRICES AND PRODUCTION IN HYPER-INFLATION: GERMaANY, 1920-1923 (1930) 61
et seq. Similarly Russian inflation was moulded under the banner of communism which
presupposed a destruction of vested rights and, in particular, of monetary values. See
supra, p. 12.
138. In actions on contracts which were made in Russia before the revolution, the
courts have often been content simply to say that "old rubles" have become "worthless"
and that consequently there can be no recovery. See, e.g., Augustus N. Hand, J., in Till-
man v. Russo Asiatic Bank, 51 F. (2d) 1023, 1026 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931); Crane, J., il
Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 266 N. Y. 71, 90, 100, 193 N. E. 897,
903, 907 (1934), discussed supra pp. 4-5. "Old rubles" had, indeed, now become mere
collectors' items. But the parties, when they contracted in rubles, had not had in mind
mere colored pieces of paper. Being no longer a standard of value or a medium of ex-
change, "old rubles" had ceased to be the rubles stipulated in the contracts. It is not suffi-
cient, therefore, simply to observe that the "old rubles" have disappeared. In determining
the bearing of the "disappearance" of "old rubles" on old contracts in rubles, the courts
must not shut their eyes to circumstances attending the "disappearance" which disclose
that it was a part of a confiscatory action. Cf. Rashba, supra note 128, at 1100 et seq.
Confiscation is "an act done in some way on the part of the government of the coun-
try where it takes place, and in some way beneficial to that government; though the pro-
ceeds may not, strictly speaking, be brought into its treasury." Ellenborough, L. J., in
Levin v. Allnut, 15 East 267, 269, 104 Eng. Rep. R. 845, 846 (K. B. 1812).
[Vol. 54 : 1
1944] DEBTS IN COLLAPSED FOREIGN CURRENCIES 35
revolutionary periods and frequently have "actually attained such effect
as to alter the rights and obligations of parties in a manner" which the
courts "may not in justice disregard." "I There is, however, no rule un-
qualifiedly requiring that such measures, particularly in regard to intangi-
bles, be given extraterritorial effect. The traditional view has been that
confiscation is "condemned by the enlightened conscience and judgment
of modern times" and is "contrary to the practice of civilized nations." 149
VII
If the courts undertake to revalue claims contracted in a foreign cur-
rency, they may have to deal with difficult and complex questions: What
shall be the measure of revaluation, what factors shall be taken into ac-
count, and what weight shall be given to each factor? To what extent shall
secured claims be revalued as against subsequent purchasers and lien-
holders? To what extent shall relief be accorded to assignees who bought
claims at a discount? In what circumstances, if any, may closed trans-
actions be reopened?
Judges, driven by a desire to do justice, though, as was Lord Mansfield,
"at a loss" as to how to measure the recovery, may deem At preferable, as he
did, to make a rough approximation at justice 1.11 rather than simply to
hold that nothing can be done. The difficulties which have been mentioned
are not insurmountable, however, and have been in some degree overcome
in varioug countries where claims in collapsed currencies have been the
subject of much litigation.
But the primary question, of course, is whether in American courts re-
valuation is permissible at all. This is the question which this article has
attempted to answer. On principle and also, it is submitted, on authority,
there is no warrant for the view 142 that for loss resulting from unrestricted
inflation of a foreign currency "our law furnishes no remedy."
139. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N. Y. 220, 225, 126 N. E. 679, 631 (1933).
140. Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. 532, 536 (U. S. 1868). Cf. mipra notes 50, 56.
141. See Deering v. Parker, 4 Dall. xxiii (P. C. 1760), discussed spra, pp. 18-9.
142. See Lehman, J., concurring, in Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,
266 N. Y. 71, 113, 193 N. E. 897, 913 (1934), discussed supra, p. 4.
